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Abstract—In this paper we propose a user dependent scheme
for enhancing security of the transmitted content in the future
telecommunication systems. In order to achieve a higher level
of security we introduce a scheme where the user identity
gets involved in the encryption/decryption processes using an
additional component for the block cipher which represents the
user’s behavioural model. Applying such a scheme, in addition
to introducing more difficulties to an attacker due to the user
dependency of the cipher algorithm, gives the mobile operator
the opportunity to ensure that a licensed service has not been
shared by the customer.
To show the feasibility of our approach we use the concept of
invertible Boolean functions as an example.
Index Terms—Behavioral model box; User dependent cryptog-
raphy;
I. INTRODUCTION
Third generation (3G) networks represent the recent stage
in the evolutionary process of developing and standardizing
high speed transmission of data in cellular networks; they
provide users with high transmission bandwidths which allow
them to transmit both audio and video information. Besides
using cell phones for voice communication, we are now able
to access the internet, conduct monetary transactions, send text
messages etc. using our cell phones, and new services continue
to be added [1]. This rapid development of cellular mobile
data services has made people increasingly reliant on cellular
phones in their daily lives for important and sensitive tasks
such as E-shopping and E-banking [2].
The past experiences with security indicate that there are
always possibilities for some weak points that have not been
taken into account. The lack of physical security for mobile
devices imposes these networks to more vulnerability. The
attackers could utilize various techniques to crack the secrets
embedded in mobile devices. Due to the high price of tamper
resistant hardware and software, it does not make sense to
consider cell phones with such equipment. So, a compromised
device can provide open access to all the secrets associated
with the device to the attacker. Therefore all authentication
techniques become helpless and result in great damage to the
whole system [2]. A simple example is when an attacker clones
a SIM card, she can easily enjoy the services which the owner
has registered for, until the owner realizes and requests to
invalidate the card. The weak point here is that if an intruder
can attack the system after the authentication phase, she can
abuse the current session and get access to the service provided
by the network.
In this paper we describe a scheme which utilizes be-
havioural model based profiles embedded in cryptographic
modules to achieve both authenticity and confidentiality in
mobile telecommunication networks. The rest of the paper is
organized as follows: Section II provides a brief survey of
the current security mechanisms in mobile telecommunication
networks and the proposed behavioural model techniques
which can be applied to achieve more security. The exact
motivation of this work has been clarified in Section III. In
section IV we introduce our scheme for behavioural model
based ciphers, and provide an example of such a design in
section V. Finally, we conclude the paper in section VI.
II. RELATED WORKS
In this section we will quickly go through the security
mechanisms which have been implemented in existing cellular
networks as well as some applications of the user behavioural
model in providing security in telecommunication systems.
Global System for Mobile communications or originally
Groupe Special Mobile (GSM) [3] and Universal Mobile
Telecommunications System (UMTS)[4], [5] are known as
the most popular second generation (2G) and third generation
(3G) mobile telephony networks, respectively. They have
been designed in such a way that they provide some user-
related security features for authentication, confidentiality and
anonymity [6]. Every subscriber of a GSM network shares a
long term secret key Ki with its home network where she
has originally subscribed to. Both the authentication in visited
network and session key generation is based on this key. In
order to perform the authentication, an authentication vector,
consisting of a challenge response pair (RANDG, RESG) and
an 64 bits encryption key Kc, will be generated by the Au-
thentication Center in the home network and will be forwarded
to the Mobile Switching Center in the visited network. A
successful authentication is when the mobile station manages
to generate the correct response RES∗
G
(comparing to RESG)
and Kc using the challenge RANDG which was received
from the network and the long term secret key Ki. Then, the
base station will receive Kc from the Mobile Switching Center
and will be able to initiate a secure communication with the
mobile station. Requests for authentication and renewal of the
encryption key Kc vary with the network operator [3], [7].
A stream cipher of the algorithm family A5 is used in GSM.
Currently A5/0 (no encryption), A5/1 (standard encryption),
A5/2 (weaker version of A5/1) and A5/3 (similar to the
KASUMI [5] algorithm used in UMTS) are defined [7]. Right
after the authentication phase it is the turn for security setup.
During this stage, the base station and the mobile station agree
on the encryption algorithm based on the security capabilities
of the mobile station and the available choices at the base
station. In GSM authentications are carried out between the
mobile station and the Mobile Switching Center and the
encryption is employed between a mobile station and a base
station.
Similar to GSM, in UMTS a shared long term secret key
between the subscriber and the home network is used to
authenticate the mobile station to the network and to generate
the secret session keys. The visited network requests an
authentication vector which is generated by the home network
to authenticate the mobile station. To provide the ability of
authenticating the network and protect the mobile station
against attackers trying to impersonate a valid network to the
mobile station, a new mechanism called Authentication Token
is applied by UMTS. Here the authentication challenge is
accompanied with the authentication token. The token contains
a sequence number which is checked by the mobile station
against a predefined range. If the mobile station verifies the
sequence number, it computes the authentication response
RESU and the encryption and integrity protection keys CK
and IK and sends RESU back to the Mobile Switching Cen-
ter. UMTS uses 128 bits encryption and integrity keys (twice
as long as the GSM key). Unlike GSM, in UMTS there are
counters for the number of packets that have been encrypted
(integrity protected) with the same encryption (integrity) key.
As soon as one of the counters exceeds an operator-set limit,
a new authentication is enforced immediately before the next
connection to a base station [6], [7].
A stream cipher based on the block cipher KASUMI is
defined for UMTS as the encryption algorithm. In UMTS
the encryption reaches further than GSM, into the backbone
network, and namely the Radio Network Controller which is
located between the base station and the Mobile Switching
Center[7].
A higher level of security can be achieved by trying to detect
anomalies in the user’s behaviour. Using behavioural model
based approaches for user identification in computer systems,
has been studied in various works [8], [9]. For instance, when
a user types a word, say a password, the keystroke dynamics
can be characterized by a “timing vector”, consisting of the
duration of keystrokes and the time interval between them.
Cho et al. have proposed an autoassociator neural network
that is trained with the timing vectors of the owner’s keystroke
dynamics and then used to discriminate between the owner and
an imposter[10].
In GSM or UMTS, a mobile phone or mobile station uses
its subscriber identity module (SIM) to gain network access
through authentication. [11] investigates the fraudulent usage
of mobile telecommunications services due to cloned SIM.
They have shown how quickly the fraudulent usage can be
detected under the existing GSM/UMTS mobility management
and call setup procedures.
The work in [12] presents an on-line security system for
fraud detection by impostors and improper use of mobile
phone operations based on a neural network (NN) classifier.
It acts solely on the recent information and past history of the
mobile phone owner activities, and classifies the telephone
users into classes according to their usage logs. Such logs
contain the relevant characteristics for every call that was
made.
A simple and easy to use anomaly detection scheme on
mobile phones is provided in [13]. The scheme records the
keystrokes as the phone is operating, and the anomaly detec-
tion algorithm calculates a score of similarity, to detect the
illegal users.
Exploiting the location history traversed by a mobile user
has been used for providing two domain-independent on-line
anomaly detection schemes, namely the Lempel-Ziv (LZ)-
based and Markov-based detection schemes in [2]. The authors
focused on the identification of a group of especially harmful
internal attackers. For both schemes, cell IDs traversed by each
mobile user are extracted as the feature value.
III. MOTIVATION
There are varieties of block cipher designs aiming to protect
the data against different kinds of attacks. All of them try to
utilize some mechanisms to introduce enough confusion and
diffusion, and achieve an acceptable level of secrecy. The mo-
tivation behind this work is to present a scheme, which can be
offered by mobile operators in order to achieve a higher level
of security, by considering the identity of the customer and
her behavioural model in the encryption/decryption process,
and thereby ensure that the person who has registered for the
service will receive it, and not anyone else. This scheme is
made to be easily adapted and utilized in existing encryption
algorithms to make them more resilient to attacks. In order to
achieve this goal we introduce a new box for block ciphers
which affects the encryption/decryption process depending on
the user behavioural model.
Another interesting problem that can be addressed by the
above scheme is when the mobile operator wants the sub-
scriber to solely use the service. In other words, they want the
service to be accessed only by the person that has paid for the
license.
For example, access to the IEEE digital library on the cell
phone requires a license and the subscriber is not supposed to
share this service with the others.
IV. DESIGN
The assumption by mobile operators that only the subscriber
knows the secret keys (or has the secret devices) and that she
Fig. 1. Architecture of secure communication using behavioural model based
encryption/decryption
is responsible to protect them, is considered as the root of our
problem. In this case, whoever finds out about them can imper-
sonate the owner and abuse this information to receive services
from the operator. But what happens if the operator somehow
involves the identity of the user in the encryption mechanisms?
Assume the operator knows some specific characteristics of
the user which can be examined during the service time and
somehow tries to make the encryption process dependent to
this characteristic. Then it will become extremely difficult for
someone else to use the service even if she knows the secret
keys or the secret device.
Assuming such a mechanism is applied in providing net-
work based services, the attacker faces a serious problem. The
most essential requirement for her is to know the encryption
algorithm over which the communication is based. She cannot
blindly try to break a secure communication. In order to
know the exact encryption algorithm she requires at least the
identity of the user as well as the user’s specific characteristics,
which are known by the operator and considered in the
encryption algorithm. Only when she has her hands on all
this information, she can launch different sorts of attacks and
hope to find the keys. In the case where the key is stolen (not
discovered), the attacker cannot proceed easily because the
decryption process of such a secure channel also considers
the user’s characteristics for retrieving the content. As a result
the attacker again needs to find out the specific characteristics
of the user and imitate them to have the same encryption
procedure that the operator expects. Otherwise, the operator
will not be able to decipher the content and it fails to provide
the service.
In this section we talk about a proper high level design
of a secure system which satisfies the goals described above.
The global picture of such a design is shown in Fig 1. It
depicts the elements of the system at both the client and
operator. Behavioural Model Detector, Algorithm Adapter and
Behavioural Model Box are the major modules of this design,
and they are collaborating to provide a user dependent secure
communication.
Fig. 2. Process of adaptive behavioural model based secure services
• Behavioural Model Detector (BMD): There have
been numerous works on different techniques of user
characterization based on the pattern of interaction
with the machine or the way that she uses the service
[14], [8], [15]. It has been shown that a system can be
designed to monitor the client’s activities and extract
a behavioural model which can uniquely identify her.
Designing such a detector falls into Data Mining and
Profiling research and it is out of the scope of this work.
But the important point is the output parameters of those
processes. Similar techniques can be applied here to
obtain a Feature Set (FS) from the user’s behavioural
model. Obviously, it takes some time for the operator to
come up with such a model by monitoring the pattern
of service usage, but when the profiling is done, the
operator can offer this high level security to the users.
On the user side, there must be a BMD software module
which tries to extract the FS on-line and in a certain
amount of time. The initial values may not be accurate
enough but it must be in an acceptable level that the
operator expects. As time passes, it should get closer
to the model that is known to the operator. So, some
time periods can be defined in such a way that during
each, the system uses a model which is more accurate
than the one used in the previous stage. Another key
point is that, the FS that exists in the operator database
will not stay the same forever. After each successful
service the operator must update the model with some
formulation which takes both the current and previous
model into account. This is because the behaviour of
client will change with time. This process is clearly
shown in Fig 2. The major requirement to make such a
module practically feasible is more development in the
area of data mining and profiling techniques (which we
do expect) to have enough robustness and reliability in
BMD.
• Algorithm Adapter: After successful detection of the
behavioural model of the user, there will be some values
which are the elements of the Feature Set. The next
step is to somehow combine these values and convert
them to a module that can be used in the encryption
algorithm. On the user side, the Algorithm Adapter will
be a function G(FS) which produces a unique function
f(P ), that can be utilized in the encryption process, as
representative of the user’s identity. Therefore, this is
the part that defines the uniqueness of the encryption
process, with respect to the user. As a result, when the
user shares his service or when an attacker wants to
abuse the stolen secrets to enjoy the service, this module
produces different f(P ) as long as she is not able to
imitate the actual user. It is important to note that the
function f(P ) must be invertible since on the operator
side, the Algorithm Adapter uses the existing FS in her
database to determine f−1(C) and decrypt the incoming
data.
• Behavioural Model Box (BMB): Cipher blocks are
usually designed in components where each component is
responsible to provide some confusion or diffusion to the
cipher. The Behavioural Model Box is a new component
that we introduce to the existing encryption techniques
to achieve the user dependency that we previously dis-
cussed. Actually, the BMB is the part that is attached
to the encryption procedure, and which is responsible
to apply the function f(P ), coming from the Algorithm
Adapter. The most important issue regarding the BMB is
where to place it. Typical encryption algorithms follow a
repeating procedure where there are rounds, and during
each, the existing blocks apply their effects on the cipher.
In order to have a correct cryptographic procedure, it is
important to place the BMB correcly, in such a way that
there exists a counterpart in the decipher block, where
BMB Inverse is to be put, which in turn, is responsible
to apply f−1(C) to retrieve the original data.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS BY EXAMPLE
In order to show the feasibility of our design we present a
sample implementation of such a scheme. We describe how
Algorithm Adapter and BMB can be designed and attached
to an arbitrary cipher such as Advanced Encryption Standard
using Invertible Boolean Functions [16]. As we said before,
the design and implementation of BMD is not in the scope of
this work.
A Boolean function has an inverse when every output is
the result of one and only one input. The Boolean function
F (x1, x2, x3) = (f1, f2, f3) such that
f1 = x1
f2 = x2 ⊕ x3
f3 = x1x2 ⊕ x
′
1x3
has the inverse function F−1(f1, f2, f3) = (x1, x2, x3) such
that
x1 = f1
x2 = f3 ⊕ f
′
1f2
x3 = f3 ⊕ f1f2
where x1 ⊕ x2 is “modulo 2” or “eXclusive OR” operation.
The function can be used uniquely in either direction. The
input or output is uniquely specified, in terms of the output
Fig. 3. Behavioral Model Box design (BMB)
or input, respectively. This function is said to have an inverse
F−1. Other equivalent functions can be obtained by a non-
singular transformation of the x′s and f ′s [16] .
Let say Ψr is the set of invertible Boolean functions
F (x1, x2, ..., xr) using r variables. The number of distinct
invertible Boolean functions for r variables is equal to:
|Ψr| = 2r! (1)
corresponding to the 2r! ways the truth table can be completed
with the 2r distinct entries of F . Since the truth table for F is
a complete listing of the 2r r-digit binary numbers, each output
variable fi of F has an equal number of 0’s and l’s [16]. That
is, every output variable fi is a balanced Boolean function. It
is important to have these functions balanced because it makes
the cipher more resilient to cryptographic attacks.
Assume we want to use r variable functions with n bit
message blocks. Then we have k = n/r groups of bits.
A schematic of a BMB has shown in Fig 3 where di and
ci represent the input bits and the output bits of the BMB,
respectively. As it is shown the bits are grouped into k parts
and each part is assigned a function:
∆ri =
(
δi
1
, δi
2
, ..., δir
) (2)
where
∆ri ∈ Ψ
r
Since there is 2r! possible values for ∆ri , totally there exist
(2r!)kdifferent BMBs. Assuming two variables for a Boolean
function, there are 22! = 24 different invertible functions. So,
having a 32 bit input, there will be 32/2 = 16 groups of inputs
and each group can take any of the 24 possible function sets.
As a result 2416 = 248.316 different BMB can be defined using
this approach. This provides enough uncertainly for an attacker
who wants to find the structure of a BMB.
In this implementation, the Algorithm Adapter maps the
given FS to the selected set of ∆ri s. In order to choose of
∆r
i
we need a l bit number where
l = log2(2
r!) (3)
Since we need k = n/r number ∆r
i
so we require a k · l bit
number to be able to select the functions for a BMB. So the
Fig. 4. Function mapping procedure using Hash Algorithm Adapter
Algorithm Adapter can be considered as a hash function which
takes a FS and produces a k · l number index.
index = H(FS)
H : NM → N (4)
where M is the size of Feature Set. The global picture of this
procedure is depicted in Fig 4.
Assuming Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is used for
the next generation of mobile cellular networks, we show how
a Behavioural Model Box can be embedded in the algorithm.
AES, also known as the Rijndael algorithm [17], is a symmetric
block cipher that can process data blocks of 128 bits, using
cipher keys with lengths of 128, 192, and 256 bits. The AES
cipher is specified as a number of repetitions of transformation
rounds that convert the input plaintext into the final output
of ciphertext. Each round consists of several processing steps
(SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns and AddRoundKey). A
set of reverse rounds are applied to transform ciphertext back
into the original plaintext using the same encryption key [18].
A BMB can be either considered as a one time usage
component which affects only the input or the output of
the block cipher, or applied as a round operation component
which performs its effect in each round of AES. Obviously,
the latter case needs a careful design regarding the placement
of the BMBs and the corresponding BMB Inverses. We have
shown in Fig 5 an example of a correct installation of BMBs
and BMB Inverses in the encryption and decryption process
of AES. In this example, a BMB has been inserted after
MixColumns and before AddRoundKey operation. Hence, the
BMB Inverse must be considered after AddRoundKey and
before InverseMixColumns operation in the decryption part.
So a BMB operation is included in each round except the last
one.
Another issue which might be of interest is that by using
a stronger Algorithm Adapter, we can define different BMBs
for each round. In this case, the same flow must be taken into
account in the deciphering part.
VI. CONCLUSION
Employing the user’s behavioural model is a concept that
can enhance the security level of the next generation mobile
Fig. 5. Extended AES design using BMB
telecommunication networks. In this work we have presented
a scheme which allows the features extracted from the user’s
behaviour, to get involved in the encryption/decryption algo-
rithms using Behavioural Model Box (BMB). In this case,
there will be a higher level of confidence that only the person
who has subscribed for a service will be able to receive it.
Since the encryption mechanism works differently depending
on the user, an attacker will not be able to apply many
of the known attacks which rely on the knowledge of the
encryption algorithm, unless she recongnizes the identity and
behavioural characteristics of the user. Furthermore, if a user
wants to intentionally share a licensed service with someone
else, the service will fail because the operator side deciphering
mechanisms are extracted from the genuine user’s behaviour.
We have also shown a sample implementation of BMB using
Invertible Boolean Functions, and described how AES, being a
potential encryption mechanism for the future mobile telecom-
munication networks, can be adapted to take the behavioural
model into account during encryption/decryption processes.
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